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Was the outcome of the First World War on a knife edge? In this
major new account of German wartime politics and strategy Holger
Afflerbach argues that the outcome of the war was actually in the
balance until relatively late in the war. Using new evidence from
diaries, letters and memoirs, he fundamentally revises our
understanding of German strategy from the decision to go to war and
the failure of the western offensive to the radicalisation of
Germany's war effort under Hindenburg and Ludendorff and the
ultimate collapse of the Central Powers. He uncovers the struggles
in wartime Germany between supporters of peace and hardliners who
wanted to fight to the finish. He suggests that Germany was not
nearly as committed to all-out conquest as previous accounts argue.
Numerous German peace advances could have offered the opportunity
to end the war before it dragged Europe into the abyss.
The First World War has been described as the "primordial
catastrophe of the twentieth century." Arguably, Italian Fascism,
German National Socialism and Soviet Leninism and Stalinism would
not have emerged without the cultural and political shock of World
War I. The question why this catastrophe happened therefore
preoccupies historians to this day. The focus of this volume is not
on the consequences, but rather on the connection between the Great
War and the long 19th century, the short- and long-term causes of
World War I. This approach results in the questioning of many
received ideas about the war's causes, especially the notion of
"inevitability."
The First World War has been described as the "primordial
catastrophe of the twentieth century." Arguably, Italian Fascism,
German National Socialism and Soviet Leninism and Stalinism would
not have emerged without the cultural and political shock of World
War I. The question why this catastrophe happened therefore
preoccupies historians to this day. The focus of this volume is not
on the consequences, but rather on the connection between the Great
War and the long 19th century, the short- and long-term causes of
World War I. This approach results in the questioning of many
received ideas about the war's causes, especially the notion of
"inevitability."
There are many histories of how wars have begun, but very few which
discuss how they have ended. This book fills that gap. Beginning
with the Stone Age and ending with globalized terrorism, it
addresses the specific issue of surrender, rather than the
subsequent establishment of peace. At its heart is the individual
warrior or soldier, and his or her decision to lay down arms. In
the ancient world surrender led in most cases to slavery, but a
slave still lived rather than died. In the modern world
international law gives the soldiers rights as prisoners of war,
and those rights include the prospect of their eventual return
home. But individuals can surrender at any point in a war, and
without having such an effect that they end the war. The
termination of hostilities depends on a collective act for its
consequences to be decisive. It also requires the enemy to accept
the offer to surrender in the midst of combat. In other words, like
so much else in war, surrender depends on reciprocity - on the
readiness of one side to stop fighting and of the other to accept
that readiness. This volume argues that surrender is the single
biggest contributor to the containment of violence in warfare,
offering the vanquished the opportunity to survive and the victor
the chance to show moderation and magnanimity. Since the rules of
surrender have developed over time, they form a key element in
understanding the cultural history of warfare.
The First World War has been described as the "primordial
catastrophe of the twentieth century." Arguably, Italian Fascism,
German National Socialism and Soviet Leninism and Stalinism would
not have emerged without the cultural and political shock of World
War I. The question why this catastrophe happened therefore
preoccupies historians to this day. The focus of this volume is not
on the consequences, but rather on the connection between the Great
War and the "long 19th century," the short- and long-term causes of
World War I. This approach results in the questioning of many
received ideas about the war's causes, especially the notion of
"inevitability."
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